From Dragondoom to Dragonstar: Side-channel Attacks and Formally Verified Implementation of WPA3 Dragonfly Handshake

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```













Omine dictionary

Nom du réseau Wi–Fi (SSID): **Bbox–** Mot de passe Wi–Fi (Clé de sécurité WPA, à salsir sans espace): e376 10e4 3c75 a37d 8a8c 3806 98b7 bc





Omine dictionary







- + More secure
- + Based on a PAKE (Dragonfly¹)











- Weird choice of password conversion method
 - Probabilistic
 - Difficult to implement securely
- · Concerned were raised... and confirmed

... But Still not Bulletproof

Dragonblood is Still Leaking²



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 ¹ M. Vanhoef and E. Ronen. Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd. In IEEE S&P'20
 ² D. De Almeida Braga et al Dragonblood is Still Leaking: Practical Cache-based Side-Channel in the Wild. In ACSAC '20

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Dragonblood is Still Leaking²



- Better password conversion (SSWU)
 - Deterministic
 - Straightforward constant-time implementation
- 🛆 Not backward compatible

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Spying/Data Acquisition

- Implementation specific
- Usually noisy measurement

Comparison metric: Signal to Noise ratio





H(secret) = 10...



Х	H(x)
secret	10
pwd ₁ pwd ₂ pwd ₃	
 pwd _n	



Х	H(x)
secret	10
pwd1	01
pwd_2	10
pwd_3	11
pwd _n	10



Х	H(x)
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pwd1	01
pwd_2	10
pwd ₃	11
pwd _n	10



х	H(x pub ₁)	H(x pub ₂)
secret	10	00
pwd1	01	Х
pwd_2	10	00
pwd ₃	11	Х
pwd _n	10	11



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secret	10	00
pwd1	01	Х
pwd_2	10	00
pwd ₃	11	Х
pwd _n	10	11





We mostly analyzed Wi-Fi daemons...



... what about their dependencies, like crypto libraries?

Looking Under the Hood

def set_compressed_point(x, fmt, ec)

- Branching on the compression format
- Affects SAE (legacy version)
- 1-bit leakage
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- Skipping leading 0 bytes
- Affects both SAE and SAE-PT
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- Wide scope (targets utility function)

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Affected projects:

- hostap/wpa_supplicant with OpenSSL/WolfSSL
- iwd <u>with</u> ell
- FreeRadius with OpenSSL

def bin2bn(buf, buf_length)

- Skipping leading 0 bytes
- Affects both SAE and SAE-PT
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- Very few conditional instructions (one cache line or less)
- Many false positives with "vanilla" Flush+Reload
- Using existing attack to create a new distinguisher

Abuse prefetching behaviors to create a new distinguisher!

```
def set_compressed_point(x, fmt, ec):
    y = compute_y(x, ec)
    if y = fmt mod 2:
        y = ec.p - y
    P = init_point(x, y, ec)
    [...]
```

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    B
[...]
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def set_compressed_point(x, fmt, ec):
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Very accurate distinguisher, with a better spatial resolution!



Sustainable patch for hostap

- Cryptographic libraries refused to patch
- Many other potential vulnerabilities (\approx 400)

Shall we replace them?

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HaCl*: A Formally Verified Cryptographic Library¹

- Memory-safety
- Functional correctness
- Secret independence



¹ Thank you Alexandre Sanchez for helping with the patch integration



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crypto/

• • •

crypto.h
crypto_mbedtls.c
crypto_openssl.c
crypto_wolfssl.c

. . .



crypto/

• • •

crypto.h
crypto_hacl.c
crypto_mbedtls.c
crypto_openssl.c
crypto_wolfssl.c

• • •

Impact

A New Attack

- Dictionary attack (SAE/SAE-PT)
 - Improved signal-to-noise ratio!
 - First side-channel in SAE-PT (supposed to be ct by design)
- New generic gadget
 - Potential impact on many low-level arithmetic functions

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A Better Defense

- 3 Security patches (hostap, iwd, FreeRadius)
- Formally verified crypto implementation (HaCl*)
- Benefit from HaCl*'s team support

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Material available at

- •https://gitlab.inria.fr/ddealmei/artifact_dragondoom
- •https://gitlab.inria.fr/ddealmei/artifact_dragonstar

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Appendix

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def set_compressed_point(x, fmt, ec):
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[...]
```



return P



return P



return P



probe (B)

return P



return P



return P



return P



return P



return P



return P



return P



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return P



return P



return P



 \rightarrow return P

```
def set compressed point(x, fmt, ec):
     v = compute v(x, ec)
    if y = fmt mod 2:
       y = ec.p - y
    P = init_point(x, y, ec)
    [...]
```

return P

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